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Abstract 
Security threats in a distributed environment are one of the greatest threats in IT and big data on distributed infrastructure makes it 
more complex and difficult to implement a fool proof security framework. Network provides the access path for both inside and 
outside attacks which makes it the key access point for any type of security threats. Securing distributed infrastructure is not an 
easy task as it is complex, it requires careful configuration and it is subject to human errors.  Distributed environment should be 
open but with proper security framework in place. Testing security threats in this kind of a complex infrastructure, with huge and 
unstructured data is an on-going process. Hence we need a security testing model which is capable to identify any unauthenticated 
intrusion immediately. This paper presents a technique to test distributed environments against attacks on data integrity.  
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1. Introduction 
In this age of big data every small or big, old or new data is considered to be of great importance. Lots of analytical 
systems use this data and produce results which can be used for different purposes. So there are no single, rather 
countable sources, which contribute to data collection. Data collection is happening manually and online through 
various new and old resources. Data is being frequently created, copied and moved around. Existing distributed 
computing networks and various cloud infrastructures have deployed their own security mechanism but with rapid 
increase in data quantity and its variety, security threats have also increased1,2. This is the main reason why enterprise 
and large organizations use their own private data storage instead of using public clouds3. Privacy preservation is a 
must in Social network4, E Commerce 5, and Service Orientation and Cloud 6.  
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History shows that security breach has happened in even the largest and leading organizations7. In 2010 Google 
revealed, through one of its blog, that it had been a victim of a cyber-attack, where some of its intellectual properties 
were stolen. In 2011, Sony play station network was hacked, which shut the service for several days and millions of 
user information was exposed. Security models are never sufficient. They require constant checking and frequent 
updating.   
 
Broadly classifying the types of threats, it can be viewed as damaging existing data, stealing information, creating 
disruption in the network, exposing confidential data and corruption8. All these threats are subject to unauthenticated 
access to the system. Different service providers have implemented secure authentication systems such as Kerberos 
but still they are vulnerable to security threats. Hence there should be some testing mechanism which constantly 
checks data integrity within the system and intimates whenever there is some disruption. This paper proposes a security 
model which tests data integrity in a distributed framework. Section 2 discusses about the existing systems and pitfalls 
in the existing system, section 3 proposes a testing model to identify vulnerability towards Data Integrity attacks and 
section 4 concludes with future scope.   
2. Existing System 
Distributed System is a collection of independent nodes, as shown in Fig. 1, each of which store data fragments ( 
D1, D2, etc.). The nodes are connected via a network which could be a local area network or a wide area network 
depending on whether the nodes are situated in the same local area or different areas respectively.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Distributed System with replicated data fragments. 
2.1. Data Storage in a Distributed System 
In a distributed system the data to be stored9 is split into fragments and these fragments are distributed across 
several nodes depending on the requirement of data on that node. This process is called Data Fragmentation. Certain 
data or fragments of data may also be replicated judiciously in order to increase reliability, availability and hence the 
performance of a distributed system. Data Replication has the following advantages:  
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x Loss due to crashing of one replica can be avoided since the failed replica can be replaced by another replica. 
In other words even if a site fails but has its data replicated on another site, that data would still be accessible. 
This improves both availability and reliability.  
x Placing a copy of data within close proximity to the process using them will reduce the access time of that 
data leading to enhanced performance. 
2.2. Maintaining consistency: Two Phase Commit Protocol 
The downside of having multiple copies of the same data is maintaining consistency10 of the replicated data. This 
means that if one copy of data is changed, the corresponding modification must be made to all copies of the data. In 
order to achieve this tight consistency11, we use the Two Phase Commit Protocol (2PC). In the following example, the 
coordinator wants to update a replica of some data in the database while P1 and P2 are the participant nodes which 
also contain replicas of the same data.  
 
x Phase 1: Voting Phase – The coordinator sends a voting request (PREPARE T), after adding the request to 
its log, to all the participants with the replicated copy of the data to be updated. The participants either agree 
to commit (READY T) or abort (NO T) the transaction (which is the modification of data).  
x Phase 2: Decision Phase – The coordinator commits the transaction if all the participants reply with a 
“READY T” and sends “COMMIT T” to all the participants, as shown in Fig. 2(a), otherwise it aborts the 
transaction with “ABORT T”, as shown in Fig. 2(b).  
 
Fig. 2. (a) 2PC with committed transaction 
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Fig. 2. (b) 2PC with aborted transaction 
2.3. Problem: Attack on Integrity of Data   
Suppose an attacker makes an illegal modification to a copy of some data in Node 1 (Refer to Fig.1). For the user, 
who requests access to data D1, the distributed system is a coherent system and he is unaware of which copy of data 
is made available to him. The user could be given access to data D1 of either Node 1 or Node 2. Due to the attack, the 
content of D1 in Node 1 is different from the content of D1 in Node 2. Since the user has no way of verifying the 
integrity of data he will not realize that the data has been changed by an unauthorized person and he may continue 
using the malicious data D1.  
2.4. Solution: Hash Functions 
To overcome the problem, we can add a global Hash Store to the distributed system12,13 which consists of hash 
function values of all the data/fragments stored, as shown in Fig. 3. A hash function is a one way function which takes 
as input a message of any arbitrary length and returns a fixed length output which is called the hash or message digest 
of the input message. This hash value is appended with the message and recomputed by the receiver of the message 
in order to check for any transmission errors or to detect attacks on integrity of data. Even a small modification of a 
message causes the hash of that message to change and this property of hash functions makes them suitable for 
ensuring message integrity.  And thus if the recomputed hash value does not match the appended hash value, the 
receiver can conclude that the content of the message has been changed.  
 
Adding global Hash Store to a Distributed System will make the hash values of all the data and data fragments, 
available to the authenticated users. In this way whenever a user accesses any data he/she can confirm the integrity of 
that data by calculating the hash of the data and comparing it with the hash value retrieved from the Hash Store. The 
computed hash value will not match the retrieved hash value if the data has been modified illegally by an attacker. 
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Fig. 3. Distributed Network with Hash Store 
2.5. Modified Two Phase Commit Protocol 
The calculation of hash values for each data/data fragment can be done at the end of the Two Phase Commit 
Protocol, as shown in Fig. 4, every time a data is updated or added to the Distributed System. These hash values can 
then be stored in the global Hash Store from where it is accessible to all the authenticated users.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Modified 2PC Protocol 
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3. Testing the Existing System for Data Integrity 
If the attacker modifies the data with its hash collision then the hash function of the modified data will calculate to 
the same value as the hash of the original data. Since the hash value of both the legitimate and the malicious data will 
be same the user will not be able to distinguish between them, rendering the purpose of the Hash Store to fail. 
 
Hash Collisions: Hash Functions need to be collision resistant i.e. it should be computationally infeasible to find 
two different messages that hash to the same value. If two or more messages have the same hash value then such a 
situation is called a collision14,15. Let H: M→R be a hash function, where M is the message space and R is the resulting 
hash value space. Since M is more than R, according to the pigeonhole principle, there will be more than one message 
in M which will hash to the same value in R. These collisions can be found out using a parallel collision search 
technique16,17 as follows:  
 
- Let m ϵ M be the message for which we need to find a hash collision, m’ ϵ M be the message the victim will 
willingly sign and gm: R →M be an injective function which maps a hash result in R to a perturbation of 
message m in M. The perturbation of the message is such that it doesn’t change the semantic meaning of 
message m. Since gm is an injective function for one r ϵ R there can be only one m ϵ M such that gm(r) = m.  
- Partition the set R into equal sized subsets R1 and R2 i.e. |R1| = |R2| and define a function f:R → R such that  
      
݂ሺݎሻ ൌ ܪ൫݃݉ሺݎሻ൯݂݅ሺݎ߳ܴͳሻ
ܪ൫݃݉ǯሺݎሻ൯݂݅ሺݎ߳ܴʹሻ 

- Generate a trail of points xi = f(xi-1) for i= 1,2, … until a distinguished point xd , with an easily testable property, 
is found.  
- Store the distinguished points found in a list and continue the above process until same distinguished point 
appears twice in the list. Finding same distinguished points in the list could imply that 2 trails intersected at a 
point i.e. f(xi) = f(xj) such that i ≠ j.  
- Check if xi and xj belong to different subsets R1 and R2. If they do then we have successfully found a collision 
otherwise repeat the above steps till you find a collision. 
 
A system is vulnerable to Data Integrity attacks if the testing model can find collisions for the data stored in the 
system easily and replace the original data with its collision. Hence by using the above technique a testing tool can 
test the Distributed System for Data Integrity and thus provide the users with an evaluation criterion which would 
enable them to select the most secure distributed system.  
4. Conclusion/ Future Work 
The security of a Hash Function depends on its collision resistant property which is determined by the size of its 
range. Usually this size is of the order of  ʹଵଶ଼ǡ ʹଶହ଺, etc. This huge set space makes the obvious method, of selecting 
distinct inputs ݔ௜ for ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ and checking for a collision among the ݂ሺݔ௜ሻ values, very time consuming. Thus 
there is a need to marshal large processing power from distributed processors and run the collision search task in 
parallel in order to find collisions in feasible time. We aim to implement the testing algorithm mentioned above using 
the Apache Hadoop’s MapReduce framework. MapReduce’s parallel processing capability caters to the need of the 
parallel system required by the testing algorithm. It automatically partitions the data, schedules the execution of the 
algorithm across different machines and handles communication between machines.  
 
The data integrity of a Distributed System and hence its trustworthiness can be tested using the above mentioned 
technique. If the system does not have a global Hash Store then any illegal modification made to one replica of data 
fragment by the testing model will go undetected since the user will not have any means of verifying the content of 
the fragment made accessible to him. On the other hand if the system does have a global Hash Store but the testing 
model can successfully find a collision for a data fragment in feasible time using the above mentioned algorithm then 
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again the illegal modification will go undetected and the Distributed System would fail the Data Integrity Test. The 
above testing strategy will help a user to evaluate the trustworthiness of different distributed systems and choose the 
one which is strongest against Data Integrity attacks. 
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